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Abstract
We give a categorical account of Arrow’s theorem, a seminal result in social choice
theory.
1 Introduction
Arrow’s theorem [Arr50, Arr63] is a seminal result from 1950 which founded the modern field
of social choice theory. It is a no-go theorem for combining individual preferences: under
two very plausible assumptions, the only possible ‘social welfare function’ is a dictatorship!
Closely allied results, notably the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75], relate to
voting systems: when there are at least three alternatives, the only non-manipulable voting
systems are dictatorships.
Our aim in this note is to cast this result at a more abstract, categorical level, to expose
common structure with no-go theorems in other fields, such as the foundations of quantum
mechanics. This is motivated by our recent work with Adam Brandeburger on a sheaf-
theoretic approach to quantum non-locality and contextuality [AB11], and also by the work
of Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen and others on Dependence/Independence Logic [Va¨a¨07, GV12].
We shall assume only the most basic notions of category theory: categories, functors, and
natural transformations. Moreover, these will be used in a simple, concrete setting. Thus
the categorical language should not be an impediment to readers interested in a structural
account of Arrow’s theorem.
1.1 What Arrow’s Theorem Says
Let A be a set of alternatives, and I a set of individuals.
P(A) is the set of preference relations on A. These are usually taken to be weak
orders (transitive and connected relations), sometimes linear orders (transitive, connected
and antisymmetric).
P(A)I is the set of profiles or ballots, which assign a preference relation on the alterna-
tives to each individual — a “vote”.
A social welfare function is a map
σ : P(A)I −→ P(A).
Such a map produces a single ranking on alternatives — a social choice — from a profile.
Two conditions are standardly considered on such functions:
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• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The social decision on the relative
preference between two alternatives a, b depends only on the individual preferences
between these alternatives. It is independent of their rankings with respect to other
alternatives.
• The Pareto or Uniformity Principle (P). If every individual prefers a to b, then
so should the social welfare function.
We can now state Arrow’s Theorem more formally as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (Arrow’s Theorem) If |A| > 2 and I is finite, then any social welfare
function satisfying IIA and P is a dictatorship: i.e. for some individual i ∈ I, for all
profiles p ∈ P(A)I and alternatives a, b ∈ A:
a σ(p) b ⇐⇒ a pi b.
Thus the social choice function, under these very plausible assumptions, simply copies the
choices of one fixed individual — the dictator.
An extraordinary number of different proofs, as well as innumerable variations, have
appeared in the (huge) literature. For a small selection, see [Arr63, Bla72, KS72, Tay05].
A closely related result is theGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75] on voting
systems:
Theorem 1.2 If |A| > 2 and I is finite, then any voting system
v : P(A)I −→ A
which is non-manipulable is a dictatorship.
The following quotation from the recent text [Tay05] nicely captures the significance of
the result:
“For an area of study to become a recognized field, or even a recognized subfield,
two things are required: It must be seen to have coherence, and it must be seen
to have depth. The former often comes gradually, but the latter can arise in a
single flash of brilliance. . . .With social choice theory, there is little doubt as to
the seminal result that made it a recognized field of study: Arrow’s impossibility
theorem.”
The further contents of the paper are as follows. In Section 2, we shall present a fairly
standard account of Arrow’s theorem which will fix notation and serve as a reference point.
In Section 3, we will reformulate Arrow’s Theorem in categorical terms, and in Section 4, we
shall give a development of the proof which uses the categorical formulation to emphasize the
structural aspects. Section 5 concludes.
2 A ‘standard’ account of Arrow’s theorem
The aim of this section is to give a clear, explicit presentation of a fairly standard account of
Arrow’s theorem and some related notions.
The arguments in Section 2.1 follow [Arr63], with some clarifications and refinements due
to [Bla72]. In Section 2.2, we follow [KS72].
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2.1 Preference Relations
We consider a number of properties of binary relations R ⊆ A2 on a set A. These are all
universally quantified over elements a, b, c ∈ A:
Reflexivity aRa
Irreflexivity ¬aRa
Symmetry aRb ⇒ bRa
Antisymmetry aRb ∧ bRa ⇒ a = b
Transitivity aRb ∧ bRc ⇒ aRc
Connectedness aRb ∨ bRa.
A weak preference relation is a transitive connected relation. We write P(A) for the
set of all weak preference relations on A. Given a weak preference relation R, we can define
two other relations:
Strict Preference aPb := aRb ∧ ¬bRa.
Indifference aIb := aRb ∧ bRa.
Then P is a strict ordering (transitive and irreflexive), while I is an equivalence relation
(reflexive, symmetric and transitive). These relations satisfy the following properties:
Trichotomy aPb ∨ bPa ∨ aIb.
Absorption aIb ∧ bPc ∧ cId ⇒ aPd.
A weak preference relation is linear if it additionally satisfies antisymmetry. We write
L(A) for the set of linear preference relations on A. If R is linear, then the associated
indifference relation I is just the identity relation, while P is a strict linear order.
Given A ⊆ B, we can define a restriction map P(B) → P(A) :: R 7→ R|A, where R|A :=
R ∩ A2. Note that the truth of any property of R expressed by a universal sentence is
preserved under restriction, so this is well-defined; moreover, the same operation also defines
a map L(B)→ L(A).
2.2 Social choice situations
We shall define a class of structures which provide the setting for Arrow’s theorem.
A social choice situation is a structure (A,I,D, σ) where:
• A is a set of alternatives.
• I is a set of individuals or agents.
• D ⊆ P(A)I is the set of allowed ballots or profiles of individual preferences.
• σ : D → P(A) is the social choice function.
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We write pi for the weak preference relation of the individual i in a profile p. We write
p>i for the strict preference relation associated with pi. Similarly, we write σ(p)
> for the
strict preference relation associated with σ(p). We extend restriction to profiles pointwise:
(p|A)i := pi|A.
We shall now define a number of properties of social choice situations.
UD Unrestricted domain:
∀a, b, c ∈ A.∀p ∈ P({a, b, c})I .∃q ∈ D. q|{a, b, c} = p.
P Pareto:
∀a, b ∈ A.∀p ∈ D. (∀i ∈ I. ap>i b) ⇒ aσ(p)
>b.
WP Weak Pareto:
∀a, b ∈ A.∀p ∈ D. (∀i ∈ I. ap>i b) ⇒ aσ(p)b.
IIA Independence of irrelevant alternatives:
∀a, b ∈ A.∀p, q ∈ D. p|{a, b} = q|{a, b} ⇒ σ(p)|{a, b} = σ(q)|{a, b}.
D Dictator:
∃i ∈ I.∀a, b ∈ A.∀p ∈ D. ap>i b ⇒ aσ(p)
>b.
We can now state Arrow’s theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Arrow) Let (A,I,D, σ) be a social choice situation with |A| ≥ 3, satisfying
UD, IIA and P. Then if I is finite it also satisfies D, i.e. there is a dictator.
2.3 Proof of Arrow’s Theorem
In this section we shall fix a social choice situation (A,I,D, σ) satisfying the following condi-
tions: |A| ≥ 3, UD, and IIA.
2.3.1 Decisiveness, Neutrality and Monotonicity
In this subsection, we shall assume that our social choice situation satisfies the weak Pareto
principle WP.
Given U ⊆ I and p ∈ D, we introduce the notation ap>Ub := ∀i ∈ U. ap
>
i b. Given a set
U ⊆ I and distinct elements a, b ∈ A, we define
Uab := {p ∈ D | ap
>
Ub ∧ bp
>
Uca}.
We define a relation DU on A by
aDUb := a 6= b ∧ ∀p ∈ Uab. aσ(p)
>b.
We read aDUb as “U is decisive for a over b”.
Proposition 2.2 For all a, b, c ∈ A:
1. If c 6= a, then aDUb ⇒ aDUc.
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2. If c 6= b, then aDUb ⇒ cDU b.
Proof For (1), if b = c there is nothing to prove. If b 6= c, we consider a profile p ∈ D
such that for all i ∈ U , pi restricts to the strict chain abc, and for all i ∈ U
c, pi restricts
to the strict chain bca. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that p ∈ Uab ∩ Uac ∩ Ibc. Since
aDUb, aσ(p)
>b, while by WP, bσ(p)c. By transitivity if bσ(p)>c, or by absorption otherwise,
aσ(p)>c. Now consider any profile q such that q ∈ Uac. Then q|{a, c} = p|{a, c}, and by IIA,
aσ(p)>c ⇒ aσ(q)>c; thus aDUc. The argument for (2) is similar. 
As pointed out in [Bla72], the following purely relational argument allows us to conclude
Neutrality from the previous proposition.
Proposition 2.3 Let R be an irreflexive relation on a set X with at least three elements,
such that, for all a, b, x ∈ X:
1. If x 6= a, then aRb ⇒ aRx.
2. If x 6= b, then aRb ⇒ xRb.
If x, y are any pair of distinct elements of X, then aRb ⇒ xRy.
Proof If y 6= a, then aRb ⇒ aRy ⇒ xRy. If x 6= b, then aRb ⇒ xRb ⇒ xRy.
Otherwise, x = b and y = a, and we must prove aRb ⇒ bRa. In this case, since X has at
least three elements, we can find c ∈ X with a 6= c 6= b. Then:
aRb ⇒ aRc ⇒ bRc ⇒ bRa.

As an immediate consequence of Propositions 2.2 and 2.3, we obtain
Theorem 2.4 (Local Neutrality) For all a, b, x, y ∈ A with x 6= y:
aDU b ⇒ xDUy.
We now define a relation EU on A by:
aEUb := ∀p ∈ D. ap
>
Ub ⇒ aσ(p)
>b.
Thus we ask only that the individuals in U strictly prefer a to b; there is no constraint on
those outside U . Clearly, aEUb ⇒ aDUb. The converse is an important property known as
monotonicity.
Proposition 2.5 (Monotonicity) For all a, b ∈ A, aDUb ⇐⇒ aEUb.
Proof We shall prove aDUb ⇒ aEUb. Suppose we are given a profile p such that ap
>
Ub.
We can find an element c ∈ A with a 6= c 6= b. We consider a profile q ∈ D such that for all
i ∈ U , qi restricts to the strict chain acb, and for all i ∈ U
c, c is strictly preferred to both a and
b in qi, while qi|{a, b} = pi|{a, b}. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that q ∈ Uac ∩ Icb, and
q|{a, b} = p|{a, b}. Since aDU b, by Proposition 2.2 aDUc, and so aσ(q)
>c. By WP, cσ(q)b.
By transitivity if cσ(q)>b, or by absorption otherwise, aσ(q)>b. Since p|{a, b} = q|{a, b}, by
IIA we conclude that aσ(p)>b, and hence aEUb as required. 
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2.3.2 The Ultrafilter of Decisive Sets
In this subsection, we assume the strong Pareto principle P, which serves as a basic existence
principle for decisive sets. Note indeed that P is equivalent to the statement that I is a
decisive set.
We define
U := {U ⊆ I | ∃a, b ∈ A. aDUb}.
Theorem 2.6 (The Ultrafilter Theorem) U is an ultrafilter.
Proof (F1) As we have already noted, P implies that I ∈ U .
(F2) Now suppose that U ∈ U and U ⊆ V . By Proposition 2.5, we can conclude that
V ∈ U , since clearly U ⊆ V implies that EU ⊆ EV .
(F3) Now suppose for a contradiction that U and V are both in U , where U ∩ V = ∅.
Consider a profile p ∈ D such that ap>Ub and bp
>
V a. By Proposition 2.5, we have both aσ(p)
>b
and bσ(p)>a, yielding a contradiction.
(F4) Finally suppose that U ∈ U can be written as a disjoint union U = V ⊔W . We
shall show that either V ∈ U or W ∈ U . Consider a profile p ∈ D such that for each i ∈ V ,
pi restricts to the strict chain bca, for each i ∈ W , pi restricts to the strict chain cab, while
for each i ∈ U c, pi restricts to the strict chain abc. Such a profile exists by UD. Note that
p ∈ Uca ∩ Vba ∩Wcb. We argue by cases:
• If cσ(p)>b, then by IIA, for all q ∈Wcb, cσ(q)
>b, and hence cDW b, and W ∈ U .
• Otherwise, we must have bσ(p)c. Since p ∈ Uca and U ∈ U , using the Neutrality
Theorem 2.4, we must have cσ(p)>a. By absorption, bσ(p)>a. By IIA, for all q ∈ Vba,
bσ(q)>a, and hence bDV a, and V ∈ U .
The conditions (F1)–(F4) are easily seen to be equivalent to the standard definition of an
ultrafilter, given as (F1) and (F2) together with:
(F5) ∅ 6∈ U .
(F6) U, V ∈ U ⇒ U ∩ V ∈ U .
(F7) ∀U ⊆ I. U ∈ U ∨ U c ∈ U . 
We define the set of ballots which are linear on the alternatives a, b:
Lab := {p ∈ D | p|{a, b} ∈ L({a, b})} = {p ∈ D | ∃U ⊆ I. p ∈ Uab}.
We now show that U completely determines σ on linear ballots.
Proposition 2.7 For all a, b ∈ A, p ∈ Lab:
aσ(p)>b ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I | ap>i b} ∈ U .
Proof The right-to-left implication is immediate, since if U = {i ∈ I | ap>i b}, p ∈ Lab
implies that p ∈ Uab. For the converse, we use property (F7) from Theorem 2.6. 
We also show that social choice functions map linear ballots to strict preferences.
Proposition 2.8 For all distinct alternatives a, b ∈ A:
∀p ∈ Lab. aσ(p)
>b ∨ bσ(p)>a.
Proof Immediate from the previous proposition and property (F7) from Theorem 2.6. 
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2.4 Arrow’s Theorem
Theorem 2.9 (Arrow) Let (A,I,D, σ) be a social choice situation with |A| ≥ 3, satisfying
UD, IIA and P. Then if I is finite it also satisfies D, i.e. there is a dictator.
Proof By the Ultrafilter Theorem 2.6, U is an ultrafilter. Since I is finite, U must be
principal, consisting of all supersets of {i} for some i ∈ I. ThenD{i} is decisive, or equivalently
by Proposition 2.5, i is a dictator. 
3 Categorical Formulation of Arrow’s Theorem
Given a universe A of possible alternatives, where the cardinality of A is ≥ 3, we consider the
category C whose objects are subsets of A, and whose morphism are injective maps; and its
posetal sub-category Cinc with morphisms the inclusions. We shall use C
(k) and C
(k)
inc to denote
the full sub-categories of C and Cinc respectively determined by the sets A of cardinality ≤ k,
for k ≥ 0. We write Cop for the opposite category of C.
For any notion of binary preference relation axiomatized by universal sentences (universal
closures of quantifier-free formulas), we get a functor
P : Cop −→ Set.
P(X) is the set of preference relations on X, and if f : X > > Y and p ∈ P(Y ), then we
define
x (P(f)(p))x′ ⇐⇒ f(x) p f(x′).
Note that injectivity ensures that (X,P(f)(p)) is isomorphic to a sub-structure of (Y, p), and
hence the truth of universal sentences is preserved [Hod97].
Also note that P cuts down to a functor Pinc : C
op
inc −→ Set.
We shall use P to denote the functor induced by the notion of weak preference relation
introduced in the previous section, and L for the subfunctor of linear preference relations.
3.1 Categorical formulation of UD
The functor PIinc is defined as the product of I copies of Pinc; thus for each A, P
I
inc(A) :=
Pinc(A)
I . This gives the set of all possible profiles over a set of alternatives A for the agents
in I. We shall assume we are given a subfunctor D of PI . Thus D : Cop −→ Set is a functor,
with a natural transformation D
.
✲ P
I whose components are inclusion maps. D restricts
to a functor Dinc : C
op
inc −→ Set.
The axiom UD can be stated in these terms as follows:
(CUD) (i) For A ∈ C(3), Dinc(A) = P
I
inc(A).
(ii) Dinc preserves epis.
The requirement that Dinc preserves epis means that inclusions ι : A ⊂ ✲ B are mapped to
surjections Dinc(ι) : Dinc(B) −→ Dinc(A).
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3.2 Categorical formulation of IIA
Next, we make the observation that IIA is equivalent to the following statement:
(CIIA) The social welfare function is a natural transformation
σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc.
Explicitly, this says that for each set of alternatives A we have a map
σA : Dinc(A) −→ Pinc(A)
such that, for all inclusions A ⊆ B and profiles p ∈ Dinc(A):
σA(p|A) = σB(p)|A
More precisely, we have the following result.
Proposition 3.1 We assume that Dinc is a subfunctor of P
I
inc satisfying CUD.
1. If σA : Dinc(A) −→ Pinc(A) is a function satisfying IIA, then it extends to a natural
transformation σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc.
2. If σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc is a natural transformation, then for every A ∈ C, σA satisfies IIA.
Proof 1. Firstly, note that (A,I,Dinc(A), σA) is a social choice situation in the sense of
the previous section. We are assuming that this structure satisfies IIA.
We note that IIA implies the following, more general statement: for all A ⊆ A, and
p, q ∈ Dinc(A),
p|A = q|A ⇒ σA(p)|A = σA(q)|A.
This holds because any binary relation on a set X is determined by its restrictions to the
subsets of X of cardinality ≤ 2.
Given A ⊆ A and p ∈ Dinc(A), by CUD there is q ∈ Dinc(A) such that q|A = p. We
define σA(p) := σA(q)|A. By our previous remark, this is independent of the choice of q. For
naturality, if ι : A ⊂ ✲ B and p ∈ Dinc(B), then for any q ∈ Dinc(A) such that q|B = p,
q|A = Dinc(ι)(q|B), and hence
σA ◦ Dinc(ι)(p) = σA(q)|A = (σA(q)|B)|A = Pinc(ι) ◦ σB(p).
2. For the converse, if σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc is a natural transformation, A ⊆ A, and ι :
{a, b} ⊂ ✲ A, then p, q ∈ Dinc(A) with p|{a, b} = q|{a, b} means that Dinc(ι)(p) = Dinc(ι)(q).
Using naturality, we have
σA(p)|{a, b} = Pinc(ι) ◦ σA(p) = σ{a,b} ◦ Dinc(ι)(p) = σ{a,b} ◦ Dinc(ι)(q) = σA(q)|{a, b}.

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3.3 Categorical formulation of P
Consider the standard diagonal map ∆I : X −→ X
I . An arrow f : XI → X is diagonal-
preserving if f ◦∆I = idX . The Pareto condition is essentially a form of diagonal preserva-
tion.
Firstly, note that given a functor F : Copinc −→ Set, we can define the restriction F
(2) :
(C
(2)
inc )
op −→ Set. Now ∆I induces a natural transformation L
(2)
inc
.
✲ (PIinc)
(2). Using
part (i) of CUD, this factors through the inclusion D
(2)
inc
⊂ ✲ (PIinc)
(2). Thus we obtain a
natural transformation ∆I : L
(2)
inc
.
✲ D
(2)
inc . Also, L
(2)
inc is a sub-functor of P
(2)
inc , with inclusion
e : L
(2)
inc
.
✲ P
(2)
inc . The categorical formulation of the Pareto condition is now as follows:
(CP) σ ◦∆I = e.
Diagrammatically, this is
Linc({a, b})
∆I
✲ Dinc({a, b})
Pinc({a, b})
σ{a,b}
❄
⊂
✲
Proposition 3.2 Let Dinc be a subfunctor of P
I
inc satisfying CUD, and σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc a
natural transformation. Then σ satisfies CP if and only if for every A ⊆ A, (A,I,Dinc(A), σA)
satisfies P.
3.4 Categorical Formulation of Arrow’s Theorem
A categorical social choice situation is given by a set A determining a category C, a
set I of individuals, a subfunctor Dinc of P
I
inc satisfying CUD, and a natural transformation
σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc.
Theorem 3.3 (Arrow’s Theorem: Categorical Statement) Let (A,I,D, σ) be a cate-
gorical social choice situation where |A| ≥ 3, I is finite, and σ satisfies CP. Then σ = pii for
some fixed i ∈ I, where (pii)A : p 7→ pi.
More colloquially, this can be stated as:
The only diagonal-preserving natural transformations σ : Dinc
.
✲ Pinc are the projections.
3.5 An Analogous Result in Type Theory
We remark that when Arrow’s theorem is formulated in this way, it displays an evident
kinship with a well-studied genre of results in functional programming and type theory
[Wad89, BFSS90]. These results use (di)naturality constraints to show that the behaviour of
polymorphic terms are essentially determined by their types.
We illustrate these ideas with an example.
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Question What natural transformations
tX : X
2 .✲ X
can there be in the functor category [Set,Set]?
Answer The only such natural transformations are the projections.
Sketch Use naturality to show this first for two-element sets, then to lift it. E.g.
{a, b}2
pi1
✲ {a, b}
X2
❄
tX
✲ X
❄
(a, b)
pi1
✲ a
(x, y)
❄
tX
✲ x
❄
Exercise Show that the same result holds for natural transformations XI
.
✲ X.
4 Categorical perspective on the proof of Arrow’s Theorem
We shall now revisit the proof of Arrow’s theorem from the categorical perspective.
We shall assume throughout this section that we are given a categorical social choice
situation (A,I,D, σ) satisfying CP. Note firstly that, for each A ⊆ A, (A,I,D(A), σA) is
a standard social choice situation satisfying UD, IIA and P. We shall use results from
Section 2 freely.
4.1 Neutrality as Naturality
The property of Neutrality, which in the concrete setting was stated in a ‘local’ form in
Theorem 2.4, becomes a form of naturality. To state this properly, we need to consider the
subfunctorDL of D, whereDL(A) = D(A)∩L(A)I . ThusDL(A) is the set of admissible linear
ballots. By Proposition 2.8, σ cuts down to a natural transformation σL : DLinc
.
✲ Linc.
The key neutrality property becomes the following:
Proposition 4.1 (Neutrality: categorical version) The social choice map σL extends
to a natural transformation σL : DL
.
✲ L.
The assertion of this proposition is that a social welfare function is natural with respect,
not just to inclusions, but to injective maps. Note that the family of maps {σLA} is the same:
we are claiming that additional naturality squares commute.
Proof
Let α : A > > B be an injective map. We must show that f = g, where
f := σLA ◦ D
L(α), g := L(α) ◦ σLB.
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Note that, for r ∈ L(B) and a, a′ ∈ A,
a (L(α)(r)) a′ ⇐⇒ α(a) r α(a′),
and for p ∈ DL(B),
(DL(α)(p))i = L(α)(pi).
For p ∈ DL(B), and distinct a, a′ ∈ A, by Proposition 2.7:
a f(p) a′ ⇐⇒ {i ∈ I | a (DL(α)(p))i a
′} ∈ U
⇐⇒ {i ∈ I | α(a) pi α(a
′)} ∈ U
⇐⇒ α(a)σLB(p)α(a
′)
⇐⇒ a g(p) a′.

4.2 The Factorization Theorem
We now recast the Ultrafilter Theorem into an arrow-theoretic form. Firstly, we recall some
standard notions from boolean algebra [Sik69].
Proposition 4.2 Given a set I, there is a bijection by characteristic functions between
families U of subsets of I, and functions h : 2I −→ 2, where 2 := {0, 1}. A family U is a
ultrafilter if and only if the corresponding function h is a boolean algebra homomorphism. If
I is finite, the only such homomorphisms are the projections.
We can define maps
φ : L(A) −→ 2A
2
:: φ(r)(a, a′) = 1 ⇐⇒ a r> a′
and
ψ : DL(S) −→ (2I)A
2
:: ψ(p)(a, a′)i = 1 ⇐⇒ a p
>
i a
′.
The following is a restatement in arrow-theoretic terms of the Ultrafilter Theorem.
Theorem 4.3 (Factorization Theorem) For any social choice function σ : DL
.
✲ L,
there is a boolean algebra homomorphism
h : 2I −→ 2
such that the following diagram commutes:
DL(A)
σA
✲ L(A)
(2I)A
2
ψ
❄
hA
2
✲ 2A
2
φ
❄
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The content of this result is that all the information needed to compute the social welfare
function σ is contained in the boolean algebra homomomorphism h.
The categorical form of Arrow’s theorem, Theorem 3.3, follows immediately from the
Factorization Theorem and the last remark in Proposition 4.2.
5 Discussion
One of our motivations in undertaking this study of Arrow’s theorem was to see if common
structure could be identified with notions such as no-signalling, parameter independence etc.
which play a key roˆle in quantum foundations. Arrow’s theorem is a no-go theorem of a similar
flavour to results such as Bell’s theorem. A central assumption is IIA, which is analogous
to the various forms of independence which appear as hypotheses of the results in quantum
foundations. In particular, the functorial treatment we have developed in the present paper
has common features with the roˆle of presheaves in the sheaf-theoretic account of quantum
non-locality and contextuality given in [AB11].
It must be said that, although some degree of commonality has been exposed by the present
account, the arguments are substantially different. Nevertheless, the use of the categorical
language to put results from such different settings in a common framework is suggestive,
and may prove fruitful in exploring the roˆle of various forms of independence. It will also be
interesting to relate this to the logics of dependence and independence being developed by
Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen and his colleagues.
Altogether, although modest in its scope, we hope the present paper may help to suggest
some further possibilities for elucidating the general structure of no-go results, and of the
notions of independence which play a pervasive part in these results.
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